

# 2022 FTA JOINT STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT AND RAIL TRANSIT AGENCY HYBRID WORKSHOP

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# **Effective Practices for CAP Management – Part 2**

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
# **CAP Management Agenda**

- Review Effective Practices for CAP Management Part 1
- CAP Development Exercise
- Questions



## SSOA Summary of 7 Cycles of Audits – Findings Part I - Review

#### **Total Audit Findings**




- Top 5 FTA Audit Findings For SSOAs
  - CAPs
  - PTASP Oversight
  - Annual Report Submission
  - RTA Internal Reviews
  - SSOA Staffing






## **CAP Management Part 1 - Review**

- CAP Management is number 1 Finding from FTA's SSO Audits
  - CAPs not developed for risk, hazards or investigation reports
  - CAPs are not developed for other reasons (e.g., ISAs)
  - CAPs did not include an accurate schedule



- SSOA did not ensure that RTA developed CAPs for risks, hazards or investigation reports.
- SSOA did not ensure that CAPs included an accurate schedule.
- SSOA did not ensure that the RTAs developed CAPS as required.






# **CAP Development Exercise**

#### **Accident Scenario**

- A 5:40 AM train traveling outbound entered a curve and derailed
- Derailment did not occur near special trackwork
- The train was traveling approximately 25mph at derailment and came to rest within the dynamic envelope of the inbound track
- It was the first train of the day so there were no passenger injuries, but the operator was transported to the hospital
- The Maintenance of Way (MOW) Supervisor dispatched to the scene inspect wear to wooden ties and missing spikes





## **CAP Development Exercise**


- Summary of Report Findings and Contributory Causes
  - The probable cause of the derailment was determined to be track out of gauge due to the deterioration of the wooden ties
  - A contributing factor identified was deferred inspection and maintenance due to staffing shortages caused by a retirement and employees out on disability
  - While not determined to be a cause for the derailment, the investigator learned that the operator was four months late for required recertification. A full review of operator training records uncovered that at least 40% of operators are late for recertification.



## **CAP Development Exercise**

- Discuss the potential CAPs resulting from the incident
- What timeframes would be expected for the CAPs
- Discuss any Emergency CAPs necessary to return service
- Discuss interim or temporary CAPs necessary while permeant CAPs are implemented

| # | CAP Description |
|---|-----------------|
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